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SELF-SERVING ASSESSMENTS OF 
FAIRNESS AND PRETRIAL BARGAINING 
GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, 
COLIN CAMERER, and LINDA BABCOCK* 
In life it is hard enough to see another person's view of things; 
in a law suit it is impossible. [JANET MALCOM, The Journalist 
and the Murderer, 1990] 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A PERSISTENTLY troubling question in the legal-economic literature is 
why cases proceed to trial. Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for 
the litigants-the longer the process continues, the lower their aggregate 
wealth. Although civil litigation is resolved by settlement in an estimated 
95 percent of all disputes, what accounts for the failure of the remaining 
5 percent to settle prior to trial? 
The standard economic model of legal disputes posits that settlement 
occurs when there exists a postively valued settlement zone-a range of 
transfer amounts from defendant to plaintiff that leave both parties better 
off than they would be if they went to trial. The location of the settlement 
zone depends on three factors: the parties' probability distributions of 
award amounts, the litigation costs they face, and their risk preferences. 
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According to this model,' so long as the parties share a common assess- 
ment of the potential risks and rewards from continuing litigation,2 they 
will assign a jointly held expected value to the litigation. At that point, 
any settlement above the expected value minus anticipated costs is desir- 
able for a plaintiff, and any settlement below the expected value plus 
anticipated costs is desirable for a defendant. Therefore, risk-neutral or 
risk-averse parties with similar expectations regarding the award amount 
contingent on nonsettlement have an incentive to settle that increases 
with the magnitude of the settlement zone.3 
The most commonly cited and frequently tested explanation for nonset- 
tlement is the Priest-Klein selection hypothesis.4 This model posits that 
parties possess imperfect information, which causes them to estimate a 
case's value with error.5 Cases that fail to settle are those in which the 
For the model's primary development, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach 
to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973); and William 
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971). Applications 
of this basic economic model to legal procedures include Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic 
Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. Legal Stud. 93 (1986) (applied to Rule 68 offers of judgment); 
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts about Summary Judgment, 
100 Yale L. J. 73 (1990) (applied to Rule 56 summary judgment). 
2 John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279, 296 (1973) ("a 
critical component in the motivation of ... individuals to settle out of court is agreement 
on the probabilities of the court's action"). 
3 The contract zone (or "settlement zone") is the nonempty set of agreements that both 
parties prefer to a dispute-resolution procedure. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Ru- 
binfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. Econ. Lit. 1067, 
1075-78 (1989); Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 98. 
4 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis, 14 J. 
Legal Stud. 215 (1985). We leave out of our consideration the additional effect of strategic 
bargaining. It may be in the interest of bargainers to commit to established bargaining 
positions in order to negotiate more favorable agreements. See Thomas C. Schelling, An 
Essay on Bargaining, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 281, 287-88 (1956). Bargainers who are able to 
commit credibly shift the zone of agreement in their favor. See Vincent P. Crawford, A 
Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining, 50 Econometrica 607, 609-10 (1982). This is particu- 
larly the case with institutional defendants who are repeat players in litigation and who may 
be able to dissuade potential plaintiffs from filing suit with the prospect of high investment 
levels. In situations involving repeat players, "the stakes will almost surely differ between 
the parties, because the alternative costs of their future activities are unlikely to be equal." 
Priest & Klein, supra, at 28. Commitments are credible, however, only if bargainers face 
large costs to backing down. This scenario occurs, for example, in labor-management nego- 
tiations in which union negotiators stake their reputations on achieving a certain wage 
increase. This strategy can be optimal even when it risks a positive probability of impasse. 
Impasse is inevitable if the bargainers commit to irreversable and incompatible bargaining 
positions. See Schelling, supra, at 287. 
5 The economics literature also attributes impasses to uncertainty about the bargaining 
opponent's reservation value. See Linda C. Babcock, Impasses in Contract Negotiations: 
Why Do Bargainers Use Arbitration? (unpublished manuscript, Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 
1991) (on file with authors). A ready example arises in labor-management negotiations, 
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plaintiff overestimates and/or the defendant underestimates the expected 
value of going to trial. Adhering to conventional assumptions in economic 
modeling, the selection hypothesis assumes that estimation errors are 
random, that is, they equal zero on average. Cases that go to trial are 
simply the unlucky ones in which the plaintiff's and defendant's errors 
compound to eliminate the settlement zone that would otherwise arise 
from the risks and costs associated with trial.6 
The Priest-Klein model has been tested with field data7 and experimen- 
where there is uncertainty about the firm's profitability, the consequences of a strike to 
both parties, arbitrator preferences, and the opponent's beliefs about arbitrator preferences. 
See Beth Hayes, Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information, 2 J. Lab. Econ. 57 
(1984); Joseph S. Tracy, An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes, 
5 J. Lab. Econ. 149 (1987); and Linda C. Babcock & Craig A. Olson, The Causes of 
Impasses in Labor Disputes, 31 Ind. Rel. 348 (1992). 
6 A second source of information asymmetry may be attributed to principal-agent rela- 
tionships. See Brian P. McCall, Interest Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain, J. Conflict 
Resolution 151 (1990). Negotiators (agents) may prefer to use costly dispute-resolution 
procedures in environments that are unfavorable to their constituents (principals). Negotia- 
tors will avoid settlement if the principal cannot distinguish between agent shirking and an 
unfavorable bargaining environment. This type of relationship may exist within labor unions 
in contract negotiations or between a lawyer and a client in pretrial bargaining. See, gener- 
ally, Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. Legal Stud. 189 (1987) 
(discussing incomplete picture of legal bargaining when competing claims of attorneys and 
clients for resources are not considered). 
Problems of agency are particularly acute in contingent-fee cases. See Daniel J. B. Mitch- 
ell & Murray L. Schwartz, Theoretical Implications of Contingent Legal Fees, 12 Q. Rev. 
Econ. & Bus. 69 (1972); Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contin- 
gent Fee, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 529 (1978). They are also acute where the recovery of the 
plaintiff can be played off against payment of plaintiff's counsel. For example, in Evans v. 
Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), the Supreme Court approved a settlement offer made contin- 
gent on the waiver of attorneys' fees by the plaintiffs' counsel. The facts of the case 
made the agency issue more dramatic since plaintiffs' counsel was representing a class of 
institutionalized mentally retarded minors-a group with whom he was unable to contract 
around the problems of attorney nonrecovery in a fee-waiver settlement. But the tension 
between principal and agent may lead to nonoptimal decisions by plaintiff under a variety 
of circumstances, as Professor Miller has shown. Miller, supra, at 209. 
7 Empirical assessments of the Priest-Klein selection hypothesis principally have evalu- 
ated the likelihood of a plaintiff's judgment in a litigated case. According to Priest and 
Klein, where the stakes in litigation are roughly comparable and where both parties have 
equal abilities to predict the outcome, plaintiffs should prevail at trial roughly 50 percent 
of the time. See Priest & Klein, supra note 4, at 5, 17-22 and n.42 (setting forth the argument 
and mathematical proof for this hypothesis); Priest, supra note 4, at 219. Empirical tests of 
the Priest-Klein hypothesis have primarily involved plaintiff success rates in cases that 
proceed to trial. See, for example, Priest & Klein, supra note 4, at 31 n.60 (analyzing success 
rates in tried cases in Cook County, Illinois); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The 
Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. Legal Stud. 263 
(1989) (examining plaintiff success rates in Japan); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models 
and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 Geo. L. J. 1567 (1989). A recent 
major study of cases going to judgment in California found that the Priest-Klein hypothesis 
had limited predictive force compared with variables such as party wealth, contingent or 
noncontingent payment of plaintiff's counsel, repeat litigant status of the parties, and the 
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tally. A recent study by Linda Stanley and Donald Coursey8 is most 
relevant to this article. Subjects bargained over the division of 100 valu- 
able tokens. If they were unable to determine a division during the allot- 
ted negotiation period, all the tokens were given to one subject or the 
other depending on whether an urn containing 100 red and white chips 
contained more red or more white chips. Nonsettlement costs were im- 
posed on both parties. Before negotiating, each subject privately sampled 
a certain number of chips from the urn with replacement. Stanley and 
Coursey manipulated two variables: the number of chips each subject 
sampled and the magnitude of nonsettlement costs. The Priest-Klein 
model predicts that settlement rates will increase with the number of 
chips drawn from the urn since the variance of subjects' predictions is 
larger with a smaller drawing of chips.9 This prediction was supported. 
The second prediction, however-that settlement rates would increase 
with legal costs-was not borne out. Stanley and Coursey discussed a 
variety of possible explanations for this result, including the possibility 
that increasing the settlement zone, although increasing the scope for 
settlement, also increases the zone of indeterminacy and the scope for 
bargaining. They also speculated that, although "the experiment above 
was not designed to study the psychological effects of the negotiation 
process, ... these effects may determine, in part, the outcome of negotia- 
tions."'10 
While we also test the Priest-Klein model in an experimental setting, 
our specific focus is on psychological factors that challenge its central 
assumptions. First, there exists substantial psychological research docu- 
menting the prevalence of "egocentric" biases in estimation. When peo- 
ple estimate quantities that are relevant to their own self-image-for ex- 
ample, the fraction of credit that they deserve for a collaborative task, 
how well they drive (compared to others), the esteem in which others 
hold them, or how well they have performed a task-their estimates tend 
to be biased in a self-serving fashion. This raises the question of whether 
parties to a lawsuit in fact can make an unbiased estimate of the value of 
a case. As Janet Malcom's introductory quotation suggests, plaintiffs 
availability of insurance to cover any potential judgment. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. 
Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for 
Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319 (1991). 
8 Linda R. Stanley & Donald L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothe- 
sis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, 19 J. Legal Stud. 145 (1990). 
9 One might expect subjects to lower their reservation values to take account of the high 
variance when only a small number of chips are drawn. Stanley & Coursey, however, did 
not discuss this complication (id.). 
10 Id. 
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are likely to systematically overestimate the value of their claims, and 
defendants are likely to underestimate the value of claims brought against 
them. 
Second, the Priest-Klein hypothesis and other legal-economic explana- 
tions for nonsettlement assume that the motives for settlement are purely 
pecuniary. Both plaintiff and defendant are assumed to maximize the 
expected value of their claims or the expected utility of the monetary 
outcome. In contrast, a rich literature in psychology and, more recently, 
a plethora of experiments conducted by economists testing various game- 
theory propositions indicate that people are influenced powerfully by con- 
siderations of fairness. Although the importance of fairness relative to 
pecuniary concerns may depend on the magnitude of the stakes and other 
features of the case, existing research suggests that judgments of fairness 
will exert a significant influence on pretrial negotiations. 
We present results from an experiment designed to test the Priest-Klein 
model of settlement from the vantage point of the two considerations 
raised above. In an experimental simulation of pretrial negotiations in a 
dispute arising from a motor-vehicle accident, we monitored the percep- 
tions of parties regarding the judgment they anticipate if they were to go 
to trial. We then examined the relationship between these perceptions 
and bargaining behavior and settlement. We presented subject pairs with 
identical case materials, designated one defendant and the other plaintiff, 
endowed the defendant with a fixed fund from which any settlement or 
judgment would have to be paid, and allowed the parties to attempt to 
negotiate a settlement. Absent a settlement, funds were distributed ac- 
cording to a preexisting independent "trial" judgment, and litigation 
costs (that were manipulated in the experiment) were levied. 
Our findings demonstrate the importance of both psychological consid- 
erations discussed above. Contrary to the explicit assumption in the 
Priest-Klein model, predictions of the value of the claim and judgments 
of what settlement would be fair are both biased in a self-serving manner. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the bias is a strong predictor of nonsettle- 
ment. Challenging the assumption that parties are guided purely by pecu- 
niary concerns, we find that the magnitude and distribution of costs for 
going to trial do not have the predicted effects on the probability of 
settling or the value of settlements. Despite the moderate pecuniary in- 
centives (that induced the subjects' participation in the first place), sub- 
ject disputants seemed more concerned with achieving what they consid- 
ered to be a fair settlement of the case than maximizing their own 
expected value. 
Given the burgeoning caseloads in the court system, impediments to 
settlement have received increasing attention. Legal costs impose bur- 
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dens on both parties to a suit and on society. One study of asbestos suits 
found that only thirty-seven cents of every dollar spent by both sides 
ends up in the plaintiff s hands.11 Thus, the causes of impasse-the major 
focus of our study-are not only of theoretical interest but also of great 
practical importance. Our intention is to demonstrate that consideration 
of the psychological factors influencing disputants' behavior can enhance 
the explanatory power of the economic analysis of settlement. 
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN BARGAINING 
A. Self-serving Biases 
Whereas the common assumption in economics is that errors of judg- 
ment will not be systematically biased, such biases have been the active 
focus of recent research in psychology.12 Studies have documented biases 
in probability judgments that are not eliminated by incentives for accu- 
racy or feedback.13 Such biases include overweighting of vivid informa- 
tion, revision of probability estimates more radically in some situations 
and less radically in others than is called for by Bayes's theorem, failure 
to expect regression to the mean (and misattribution when it occurs), 
misapplication of the law of large numbers to small samples, and a ten- 
dency to think that the plausible conjunction of two events is more proba- 
ble than is either event alone. These biases are widely believed to result 
from the use of judgmental heuristics--cognitive rules of thumb that are 
naturally adapted to limited human information-processing capabilities- 
instead of optimal statistical rules. 
Most relevant to the current endeavor are "egocentric" or "self-serv- 
ing" estimation biases. Seminar participants overestimate the amount of 
time they speak relative to estimates by other participants. In two-person 
discussions, both people typically believe they spoke more than half the 
time. When asked to guess the fraction of various household tasks they 
are responsible for, married couples give estimates that add up to more 
than 100 percent.14 
" James S. Kakalik et al., Costs of Asbestos Litigation 38-40 (1983). 
12 An excellent introduction to this line of research is Judgment under Uncertainty: Heu- 
ristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds. 1982) (hereinafter 
Judgment under Uncertainty). 
13 See Colin F. Camerer, Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experi- 
mental Evidence, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 981 (1987); Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, 
& Martin Weber, The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analy- 
sis, 97 J. Pol. Econ. 1232 (1989). 
14 See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 
in Judgment under Uncertainty, supra note 12, at 179. 
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There is much disagreement in psychology about the origin of self- 
serving biases. Some argue that the biases are caused by the motivation 
to feel better about oneself." Others argue that self-serving biases are 
simply an artifact of cognitive processes and serve no motivational or 
adaptive purpose.16 Thus, while the existence of egocentric biases is 
rarely disputed by psychologists, their cause is an active topic of debate. 
Egocentric biases have also been observed in dispute settings. A classic 
study measured student perceptions of a contentious football game be- 
tween Princeton and Dartmouth.17 Students from both schools watched 
a film of the game and rated the number of penalties committed by both 
teams. On the one hand, Princeton students saw the Dartmouth team 
commit twice as many flagrant penalties and three times as many mild 
penalties as their own team. On the other hand, Dartmouth students 
recorded an approximately equal number of penalties by both teams. 
Team allegiance influenced the students' perceptions of penalties. 
Two social psychologists demonstrated self-serving interpretations of 
fairness in a work context.18 Subjects were asked to specify the fair rate 
for two people who had worked either ten or seven hours at a task. The 
person who worked seven hours was always paid $25; subjects were 
asked how much the person who worked ten hours should be paid. When 
they had worked seven hours, they thought the other person should be 
paid $30.29 for ten hours of work. But when they had worked ten hours, 
they thought they deserved $35.24. The researchers cited the difference 
between $30.29 and $35.24 ($4.95) as evidence of a self-serving bias in 
wage demands. 
"5 See Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-being: A Social Psycho- 
logical Perspective on Mental Health, 103 Psychological Bull. 193 (1988). The fact that most 
people tend to exaggerate their abilities and the esteem in which others hold them while 
depressives are more realistic in their self-appraisals lends credence to the view that some 
degree of optimism is functional. See Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn Y. Abramson, Judgment of 
Contingency in Depressed and Non-depressed Students: Sadder but Wiser? 108 J. Exp. 
Psychology: Gen. 441 (1979); Lionel Tiger, Optimism: The Biology of Hope (1980). 
16 Advocates of the cognitive perspective point to evidence such as the finding that 
married couples' estimates of their responsibility for undesirable outcomes (for example, 
"causing arguments that occur between the two of you") also add up to more than 100 
percent. See Ross & Sicoly, supra note 14, at 184. 
17 Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. Abnormal 
& Soc. Psychology 129 (1954). 
18 David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. Exp. Soc. Psychol- 
ogy 418 (1979). A doctoral student of Messick's obtained very similar results in a study 
involving real payoffs. See David M. Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and 
Fairness Biases, in Equity Theory: Psychological and Sociological Perspectives (David M. 
Messick & Karen S. Cook eds. 1979) (reporting the results of E. Van Avermaet, Equity: 
A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. California, 
Santa Barbara 1974)). 
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B. Fairness 
In experimental studies, concern for fairness and unfairness affects 
bargaining.19 The classic example is ultimatum bargaining: one person 
divides an amount between herself and another person. If the other per- 
son rejects the proposed division, both people get nothing. Self-interested 
bargainers who are neither altruistic nor envious should offer the smallest 
possible amount (usually a penny) and the offer should be accepted. But, 
in most studies, people keep an average of 60 percent of the amount for 
themselves and offer 40 percent to the other person. When less than 20 
percent is offered, the offer typically is rejected.20 
Of course, even if a person is not fair-minded, she might offer 40 per- 
cent to the other person simply because she fears the other person will 
reject a lower offer. True concern for fairness can be separated from this 
kind of enlightened self-interest (that masquerades as concern for fair- 
ness) by modifying the game so that the second person must accept the 
first person's offer.21 In such dictator games, roughly equal numbers of 
subjects offer zero and offer an equal split of the total amount.22 Taken 
together, the evidence from ultimatum and dictator games shows that 
some people simply prefer to make fair offers and others make fair offers 
only because their bargaining partners will reject unfair ones. 
Surprisingly high offers in the ultimatum game led experimenters to 
study more complicated, multistage bargaining in which the amount being 
divided is reduced at each stage (reflecting the costs of delay in reaching 
an agreement) and the final stage is an ultimatum game. In most studies, 
offers were somewhere between an equal split of the amount being di- 
vided and the offer predicted by a game-theoretic analysis assuming self- 
interest (and foresight about the outcome of bargaining in future 
rounds).23 The most curious observation is that 80 percent of the offers 
19 See, for example, Reinhard Selten, Equity and Coalition Bargaining in Experimental 
Games, in Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View (Alvin E. Roth 
ed. 1987). 
20 See Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 195 (1988); 
Werner Guith & Reinhard Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison 
of Experimental Results, 11 J. Econ. Psychology 417 (1990). 
21 This modification was first suggested by Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Rich- 
ard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285 (1986). 
22 See Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, & Martin Sefton, Fairness in 
Simple Bargaining Experiments, Games & Econ. Behav. (1992, in press). 
23 See Jack Ochs & Alvin E. Roth, An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining, 79 
Am. Econ. Rev. 355 (1989); Gary E. Bolton, A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory 
and Evidence, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1096 (1991); Eric Johnson, Colin F. Camerer, Sankar Sen, 
& Talia Rymon, Behavior and Cognition in Sequential Bargaining (unpublished manuscript, 
Univ. Chicago 1991) (available on request). 
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rejected at one stage of bargaining are followed by counteroffers that 
offer less money. For example, a typical subject who turns down an offer 
of $1.75 out of $5 then will propose an equal split giving himself $1.25 
out of $2.50. These disadvantageous counteroffers are clear evidence 
that some people sacrifice money for the sake of fairness. 
C. Self-serving Assessments of Fairness in Bargaining 
While large numbers of psychology studies show self-serving assess- 
ments and many game-theory experiments show that assessments of fair- 
ness play a role in bargaining, only a few studies have combined the 
two phenomena to show that self-serving assessments of the fairness 
of different bargaining outcomes can cause disagreements resulting in 
inefficiencies. In one study, pairs of players bargained over 100 chips 
that determined their chances of winning a dollar prize (for example, 
thirty-seven chips gave a 37 percent chance of winning).24 One player's 
prize was $20 and the other's $5. Notice that there are two ways to split 
the chips equally: give fifty chips to each (equal chance of winning) or 
give twenty chips to the $20-prize player and eighty chips to the $5-prize 
player (equal expected dollar winnings). When neither player knew the 
prize amounts, they agreed to divide the chips about equally; only about 
10 percent of the pairs disagreed and ended up with nothing. When only 
the $5-prize players knew both prize amounts, however, they insisted on 
getting eighty chips (to equalize dollar winnings). Since the $20-prize 
players wanted fifty chips to equalize their chances of winning, about 30 
percent of the pairs disagreed. Thus, the tendency to focus self-servingly 
on the kind of equal split that favored oneself created disagreement.25 
In another study, pairs of MBA students negotiated the hypothetical 
sale of a piece of land, knowing only the value of the land (if they were 
buying it) or its cost (if they were selling it).26 All pairs agreed on a sale 
price. Trouble began when students negotiated a second time with the 
same partner after finding out the value or cost of the land to their partner. 
Students who had struck a good deal in the first negotiation thought that 
selling the land at the same price was fair; their partners often disagreed, 
preferring to split the difference between the land's cost and its value or 
24 See Alvin E. Roth & J. Keith Murnighan, The Role of Information in Bargaining: An 
Experimental Study, 50 Econometrica 1123 (1982). 
25 When both players knew the prize amounts, however, and knew that the other player 
knew them too, disagreements were slightly fewer (18 percent). This suggests that compet- 
ing equal-split points contribute something to inefficiency (from 10 to 18 percent) and asym- 
metry of information contributes a little bit more (from 18 to 30 percent). Id. at 1135. 
26 Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in 
Bargaining, in Justice (Barbara A. Mellers ed. 1993, in press). 
144 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
use some price they thought was more fair than the first-round price. 
While none of the pairs disagreed in the first negotiation, 20 percent 
disagreed in the second negotiation when self-serving assessments of fair 
prices influenced the bargaining. This observation is reinforced by the 
finding in a recent labor-negotiation experiment that the difference be- 
tween two opponents' assessments of a fair wage helped to predict the 
speed with which they reached agreement.27 
D. Summary 
The Priest-Klein model and most other models of bargaining under 
imperfect information share two common assumptions: people estimate 
risks without bias, and people are concerned only with their own mone- 
tary payoff (with some adjustment for risk preference). In this article, 
we test both these assumptions. First, we examine whether estimates of 
potential trial outcomes are unbiased (as assumed by the Priest-Klein 
model) or biased in a self-serving manner (as predicted by psychological 
research). Second, we test two competing explanations of bargainer be- 
havior: one assumes that disputants maximize their own expected value 
(or expected utility of money), while the other assumes disputants are 
willing to sacrifice expected value for the sake of fairness. 
In the bargaining experiment discussed below, we test for the existence 
of a pervasive self-serving bias by asking subjects to predict the case's 
value. The experimental setting measures bias in expectations by provid- 
ing adversarial parties with identical information, assuring them that the 
other party has no additional information, and introducing financial incen- 
tives for reporting expectations accurately. We test whether subjects are 
maximizing expected value or attempting to achieve fairness in two ways. 
First, we manipulate costs and check whether the manipulation has the 
effect predicted by the economic model. For example, shifting the settle- 
ment zone by reallocating $1,000 in trial costs from defendant to plaintiff 
should reduce settlement values by an average of $1,000. Failure to ob- 
serve such a shift in settlement values would be evidence against pecuni- 
ary maximization and would more tentatively support the proposition 
that subjects were concerned with fairness. Second, we examine whether 
settlement values and settlement rates are better explained by subjects' 
predictions of the amount the judge will award if the case is not settled 
(as the economic model predicts) or by their assessments of what they 
believe would be a fair settlement. 
27 Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and 
Interpersonal Conflict, 51 Org. Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes 176 (1992). 
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Besides examining the magnitude of self-serving bias and its effect on 
impasse, we also question why the bias occurs. If both bargainers' beliefs 
about fairness and arbitrator decisions are biased in a self-serving man- 
ner, dispute resolution will be aided by interventions that bring parties' 
expectations closer. Many techniques of mediation and facilitation, such 
as active listening and role reversal, can be understood in these terms.28 
Conversely, if bias interferes with the ability of parties to converge on 
an efficient settlement, the premises underlying expansive exchanges of 
information in the discovery process may be called into question. Under- 
standing the causes of the bias can contribute to the design of such inter- 
ventions as may be necessary to facilitate efficient settlements. 
III. THE EXPERIMENT 
Eighty undergraduates from the University of Chicago and eighty stu- 
dents at the University of Texas at Austin School of Law participated in 
our study. We assigned pairs of subjects the roles of plaintiff and defen- 
dant, and then they attempted to negotiate the settlement of a tort case 
arising from the collision of an automobile and a motorcycle. The injured 
plaintiff (the motorcyclist) was suing the driver of the automobile for 
$100,000. We gave both subjects precisely the same case materials and 
informed them that the information they were given was identical. The 
subjects received twenty-seven pages of actual testimony abstracted from 
a real case in Texas, including witness testimony, police reports, maps, 
and the testimony of the parties.29 Subjects were informed that, after 
editing the case materials, we had given them to a judge in Texas who 
had reached a decision regarding whether there would be compensation 
to the plaintiff and, if so, the amount.30 
Before negotiating, we asked the subjects to write down their guess of 
what the judge would award. We told them they would receive a $1 bonus 
at the end of the session if their prediction was within $5,000 (plus or 
minus) of the actual judge's award. We also asked what they considered 
28 See Roy Lewicki & Joseph Litterer, Negotiation (1985). 
29 The testimony is available from the authors on request. 
30 We told the subjects that the judge had seen the same case materials for two reasons. 
First, we wanted the subjects to know that an independent arbiter had read exactly the 
same materials they were reading. Second, we wanted them to know we had not selected 
the case based on the judgment awarded by the judge but instead had first selected the case 
and then solicited a judgment on it. If we had simply chosen the judgment from an actual 
trial, subjects might have anticipated that we would choose a case with an award amount 
lying within a particular desired range. A law professor at the University of Texas (our 
"judge") specializing in civil litigation issues computed the actual trial figure. 
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a fair amount for the plaintiff to receive in an out-of-court settlement 
from the vantage point of a neutral third party. 
We paid each subject a fixed fee ($3 at Chicago and $4 at Texas) for 
participating and gave the defendant an extra $10. The two parties then 
attempted to negotiate a settlement orally. If they settled, the defendant 
paid the plaintiff an amount of money that depended on the value of the 
settlement. Every $10,000 from the case was equivalent to $1 for the 
subjects. For example, given a $60,000 settlement, the defendant kept $4 
and gave $6 to the plaintiff. If the parties failed to settle, the defendant 
had to pay the plaintiff an amount that depended on the judge's decision 
in the case. Since the actual judgment was $30,560, this meant the defen- 
dant paid the plaintiff $3.06. In addition, costs for not settling were levied 
and systematically manipulated. Finally, after the negotiation ended, we 
asked both parties to recall and rate the importance of arguments favoring 
both the plaintiff and the defendant. 
We designed the experiment to test the two hypotheses discussed 
above. We gave the subjects identical testimony and information about 
the rules of the game, so that any systematic differences in estimates 
between defendant and plaintiff could not be attributed to differences in 
information. Even though there was uncertainty about what the judge 
would do if the parties could not settle, no private information was held 
by either party.31 In addition, we guaranteed both parties that the informa- 
tion was the complete set of facts discoverable as to the controversy: 
that the judge ruled on the case based on the same case materials. We 
also chose a fact-intensive scenario in which witness credibility and co- 
herence of testimony would predominate; there were no unclear legal 
issues that might prompt uncertainty as to arbitrator conduct.32 
First, all subjects were paired off and assigned the role of plaintiff or 
defendant. Subjects were given thirty minutes to read the case and a page 
explaining the rules for negotiating and the costs they would face if they 
failed to reach an agreement. (The latter page is presented in the Appen- 
dix for one condition.) After reading the case materials, subjects made a 
prediction of the judge's settlement and stated what they thought was a 
31 We also insured that no problems created by principal-agent relations would affect the 
outcome. For principal-agent issues to arise, there must be both a negotiator (the agent) 
and constituents (the principals). In our experiment, the parties were negotiating for them- 
selves-the use of lawyers (or other agents) to negotiate for the parties was not permitted. 
32 Because the participants were one-time players, the risk of strategic bargaining seemed 
limited. Commitment theory assumes an environment in which the parties are able to make 
their commitments credible. To be credible, there must be a mechanism whereby a bargainer 
can make the commitment irreversible (or at least extremely costly to abandon). In this 
experiment, the environment restricted the opportunity to make such commitments. 
SELF-SERVING ASSESSMENTS 147 
fair settlement for the case. They were told that this information would 
be withheld from the other party. They were then allowed to negotiate 
for thirty minutes. If they failed to reach a voluntary settlement within 
that period, the judge's decision determined the plaintiff's payment to 
the defendant, and legal costs were levied on the parties. 
There were four experimental conditions, each of which imposed differ- 
ent costs on the parties in the event of nonsettlement: A, $10,000 each; 
B, $20,000 to the defendant, none to the plaintiff; C, $20,000 to the plain- 
tiff, none to the defendant; D, $5,000 each. To calculate the actual costs 
of nonsettlement to the subjects, recall that every $10,000 in the case 
translated to $1.00 for the subjects. We imposed these varying conditions 
for four reasons. 
First, virtually all existing theories of bargaining predict that the size 
of the contract zone and not its distribution between disputants deter- 
mines the likelihood of settlement.33 In contrast, on psychological 
grounds, one might expect the distribution of costs as well as their sum 
to influence settlements.34 If the parties do focus on costs, then, with 
asymmetrical costs,35 the person favored by lower costs should view this 
as justifying a more advantageous settlement, while the person with 
higher costs should view costs as irrelevant. That is, one party will focus 
on divisions based on bargaining strength (an inverse function of costs), 
and the other will focus on divisions based on fairness. 
A second rationale arises from a comparison of conditions A and D. 
As noted above, there are two possible explanations for any observed 
effect of self-serving interpretations of fairness on settlements, one op- 
erating through expectations of arbitrator behavior, the other arising from 
bargainers' attempts to achieve what they personally view as a fair settle- 
ment. The former explanation suggests that total costs should have a 
33 See, for example, Donald L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior 
within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 Int'l. Rev. L. & 
Econ. 161-63 (1988) ("Any mechanism that increases the surplus from settlement [the 
settlement zone] . . . increases the likelihood of settlement"); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra 
note 3, at 1076. There are divergent views on this point, focusing on the effect of greater 
uncertainty in bargaining outcomes in cases with relatively large settlement zones. See 
Miller, supra note 1, at 113; Vincent P. Crawford, Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in 
Labor-Management Bargaining, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 205 (May 1981); Babcock, supra note 5. 
34 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 102-3. 
35 Examples found in the experimental literature include David M. Messick & Keith P. 
Sentis, Estimating Social and Nonsocial Utility Functions from Ordinal Data, 15 Eur. J. 
Soc. Psychology 389 (1985); Messick & Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, 
supra note 18 (citing Van Avermaet, supra note 18); Alvin E. Roth & Michael W. K. Malouf, 
Game Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining, 86 Psychological Rev. 
574 (1979). 
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major effect on reservation prices and thus on the likelihood of settle- 
ment. The second predicts that total costs will not influence settlement 
rates except insofar as they influence perceptions of fairness. By compar- 
ing settlement rates in conditions A and D, we can test these two predic- 
tions. 
The comparison between conditions A and D is also interesting because 
there has been considerable debate among economists over whether set- 
tlement should increase or decrease with the magnitude of the settlement 
zone. The prevailing view has been that settlement should increase with 
the magnitude of the settlement zone.36 This assumption, however, has 
been challenged recently on theoretical grounds37 and tested with mixed 
results.38 
Finally, virtually all economic theories of bargaining predict that any 
shift in the contract zone should result in an equivalent shift in settlement 
values. Thus, the standard prediction is that settlement values will be 
equivalent in conditions A and D, $10,000 higher in condition B, and 
$10,000 lower in condition C. The fairness perspective, in contrast, pre- 
dicts that costs will influence settlement values only insofar as they influ- 
ence perceptions of fairness. Since we would expect perceptions of fair- 
ness to hinge mainly on the case itself and not on the particulars of 
settlement costs, the counterhypothesis is that settlement values will not 
be influenced significantly by the distribution of costs. 
In the final stage of the experiment, after negotiating, all subjects were 
asked to list all the arguments they could think of that favored each side 
and to rate the importance of these arguments on a four-point scale that 
consisted of "very important," "moderately important," "minor," and 
"trivial." The page eliciting arguments favorable to the plaintiff in- 
structed the subject, "List all of the arguments you can think of that 
support a large settlement for [plaintiff] Jones. When you finish listing 
the arguments, rate each argument in terms of how important you think 
it is. How much do you think the argument would influence a judge or 
jury who tried the case?" 
One explanation for self-serving biases discussed in the psychological 
literature is that people naturally tend to pay more attention to their 
own actions and contributions than to others'.39 When asked how much 
36 See, for example, Henry S. Farber & Harry C. Katz, Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, 
and the Incentive to Bargain, 33 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 55 (1979). 
37 See Crawford, supra note 4. 
38 See Stanley & Coursey, supra note 8 (manipulating subjects' nonsettlement costs but 
failing to find any effect on settlement rates). 
39 See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 
37 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 322 (1979). 
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housework they contributed or how much they talked in a seminar, they 
tend to overestimate these values because their own actions were more 
"salient" and thus more easily recalled than those of other people. In a 
legal dispute one would expect such egocentric recall to be, if anything, 
stronger. It is natural to focus on arguments favoring one's own side in 
order to present one's case to the other party during pretrial bargaining. 
If egocentric recall or egocentric weighting of arguments is in fact the 
mechanism underlying self-serving assessments of fairness and biased 
predictions of the judge's settlement, then we would expect to observe a 
correlation between recall of arguments, assessments of fairness, and 
predictions of the judge's settlement. Furthermore, if egocentric assess- 
ments of fairness do play a role in nonsettlement, we would expect the 
recall and importance measures to be significant predictors of both settle- 
ment and settlement amounts. 
IV. RESULTS 
There were no significant differences between the two subject popula- 
tions (Chicago and Texas) on any of the key variables, so we analyzed 
the two groups together. Table 1 presents a breakdown of the percentage 
of bargaining pairs who settled during the thirty-minute bargaining period 
and the average settlements for the four cost conditions. Comparing con- 
ditions A and D, most economic theories of bargaining would predict that 
condition A would have higher settlement rates than condition D since 
the costs of nonsettlement (and hence the incentives for settlement) are 
higher in condition A than in condition D.40 Comparing the first three 
conditions, psychological theories of bargaining would predict A would 
have higher settlement rates than B and C because symmetrical costs (as 
in condition A) permit both parties to focus on fair outcomes, whereas 
asymmetrical costs (as in conditions B and C) may lead to different as- 
sessments of fairness by the two parties. 
Although settlement rates in the four conditions are not significantly 
different from each other, the ordinal pattern of settlement rates is con- 
trary to both the psychological prediction and that of conventional bar- 
gaining theory. Given the lack of significant differences between the con- 
ditions, however, our best conclusion is that costs had little effect on 
settlement rates. 
The results with respect to agreement amounts are mixed. On the one 
40 See Orley Ashenfelter, Janet Currie, Henry S. Farber, & Matthew Spiegel, An Experi- 
mental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems (unpublished manu- 
script, Princeton Univ. 1990) (available on request) (finding experimental evidence that 
dispute rates are negatively correlated with costs to disagreement). 
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TABLE 1 
SETTLEMENT RATES AND VALUES BY COST CONDITION 
COST ALLOCATION 
(in Dollars) 
NUMBER PERCENTAGE MEAN SETTLEMENT 
CONDITION Defendant Plaintiff OF PAIRS SETTLING (in Dollars) 
A 10,000 10,000 20 60 29,208 
(2,819) 
B 20,000 0 20 80 42,219 
(3,599) 
C 0 20,000 20 85 34,112 
(2,618) 
D 5,000 5,000 20 70 30,393 
(2,561) 
All conditions 74 34,517 
(1,798) 
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. 
hand, settlement amounts were approximately $10,000 higher in condition 
B than A, in line with economic theory. Also consistent with economic 
reasoning was the lack of a difference in settlement amounts between 
conditions A and D. Contrary to economic models of bargaining, how- 
ever, settlement amounts, on average, were $5,000 higher in condition C 
than in condition A. Economic theory predicts they should be $10,000 
lower. 
Table 2 presents the differences between the plaintiffs' and defendants' 
predictions of the judge's award and the differences between their per- 
ceived fair-settlement points. Here we see strong evidence for self- 
serving interpretations of fairness. Plaintiffs' predictions of the judge's 
award, on average, were $14,527 higher than defendants'. Mean plain- 
tiffs' fair-settlement values were $17,709 higher than defendants'. Both 
differences are statistically different from zero at the p = .0001 level.41 
Argument recall and importance ratings reveal a similar pattern. Plain- 
tiffs, on average, recalled .49 more arguments favoring themselves than 
favoring the defendant, while defendants recalled an average of .91 more 
arguments favoring themselves than favoring the plaintiff. Some imbal- 
ance is expected since the arguments in the case were not matched in 
41 Fairness assessments and predictions of the judge's settlement were positively corre- 
lated across subjects in the same role (r = .73 for plaintiffs; r = .71 for defendants). These 
high correlations are consistent with the notion that parties use their biased assessment of 
fairness to predict what a judge would award. As expected given the design of the experi- 
ment, there was no relationship (r = .004 and r = - .05) between plaintiff and defendant 
predictions of the judge's award or between plaintiff and defendant assessments of fairness. 
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TABLE 2 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE SELF-SERVING BIAS 
Plaintiff Defendant Difference 
Fair settlement (in dollars) 37,028 19,318 17,709 
(2,149) (1,424) (2,632) 
Prediction of judge (in dollars) 38,953 24,426 14,527 
(2,128) (1,746) (2,747) 
Number of arguments favoring plaintiff - argu- 
ments favoring defendant .49 -.91 1.40 
(.21) (.29) (.36) 
Importance-weighted arguments favoring plain- 
tiff - arguments favoring defendant 1.04 -2.79 3.77 
(.66) (.86) (1.18) 
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. 
number or importance. If there were no bias, however, then the imbal- 
ance would be in the same direction for both parties. Weighting each 
argument by the subject's rating of its importance, we see further evi- 
dence of a recall bias. Plaintiffs recalled 1.04 more importance-weighted 
arguments favoring themselves than favoring defendants; defendants re- 
called 2.79 more arguments favoring themselves. 
To determine whether there was a relationship between the magnitude 
of the self-serving bias and the settlement rates, in Table 3 we examine 
the differences in the parties' assessments. The differences are broken 
down by the pairs who settled and those who did not. The evidence for 
such a relationship is strong. Parties who settled out of court arrived at 
more similar assessments about what a fair settlement was and what a 
judge would award than those who failed to settle. For the fifty-nine pairs 
who settled, the mean difference between the plaintiffs' and defendants' 
predictions of the judge's settlement, DIFJUDGE, was $9,050; for the 
twenty-one pairs who did not settle, the average difference was $29,917. 
The difference between DIFJUDGE for the two groups is significantly 
different from zero (t(78) = 3.6, p < .001). A similarly significant pattern 
is evident in the difference between the plaintiffs' and defendants' assess- 
ments of a fair settlement, DIFFAIR. 
The variable DIFARG represents the number of arguments recalled 
by the defendant favoring the defendant minus the number favoring the 
plaintiff plus the number of arguments recalled by the plaintiff favoring 
the defendant minus the number favoring the plaintiff. This variable 
represents the tendency of both parties to recall arguments favoring 
themselves. The analogous variable, DIFIMP, is based on importance- 
weighted arguments rather than on raw number of arguments. The differ- 
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TABLE 3 
MAGNITUDE OF SELF-SERVING BIAS FOR PAIRS WHO DID AND DID NOT SETTLE 
Settled* Did Not Settle t 
DIFFAIR (in dollars) 11,941 33,915 
(2,792) (4,782) t 
DIFJUDGE (in dollars) 9,050 29,917 
(2,885) (5,448)? 
DIFARG 1.0 2.5 
(.39) (.76)11 
DIFIMP 1.9 8.9 
(1.24) (2.57)# 
NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* N = 59. 
t N = 21. 
$ t(78) = 4.0, p < .0001. 
? t(78) = 3.6, p < .0006. 1 t(76) = 1.9, p < .07. # t(76) = 2.7, p < .01. 
ence in DIFARG for those who did and did not settle is marginally sig- 
nificant (t(76) = 1.9, p < .07), and the difference for DIFIMP is significant 
(t(76) = 2.7, p < .01). 
We ran probit analyses for the probability of settling that reinforce the 
basic conclusions presented above. The probability of settling decreases 
with the difference between the parties' assessments of what is fair and 
what a judge will award. The probability of settlement also decreases 
with the degree of egocentric recall and the importance rating of argu- 
ments, but only the latter effect is significant. Once fairness, assessment 
of the judge's award, and argument recall and rating are controlled for, 
the four cost conditions do not affect the probability of settlement. Also 
noteworthy is the fact that the difference between the two sides' fairness 
assessments is a slightly better predictor, in terms of both coefficient 
magnitude and significance, than the difference in predictions of the 
judge's award. 
We also ran regressions to determine the factors that affect the volun- 
tary-settlement amounts. Whereas costs had no effect on the probability 
of settlement, they did affect the settlement amount. Pairs in condition 
B, where the defendant faced higher costs, settled for a higher amount, 
on average, than those in the other conditions. No other cost condition 
differed significantly from the baseline of condition A. 
Defendants' assessments of fairness and predictions of the judge's 
award had a major effect on settlement values. For every dollar increase 
in the defendant's perceived fair-settlement value, actual settlements 
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rose, on average, by 50 cents. A dollar increase in the defendant's esti- 
mate of the judge's settlement netted an extra 35 cents in the mean settle- 
ment.42 Again, fairness assessments seem to be marginally better pre- 
dictors of bargaining outcomes than predictions of the judge's award. 
Curiously, however, plaintiffs' predictions and fairness values did not 
have a significant effect on settlement values. 
Finally, we examined the degree to which the parties' fairness assess- 
ments and award predictions could be explained by the legal costs they 
faced or their recall of arguments. Generally, costs had no effect with the 
exception that the defendant's fairness assessments and predictions of 
the judge's settlement were significantly higher in condition C (where, if 
anything, they should have been lower). The plaintiffs' fair-settlement 
points and predictions of the judge's award were marginally and posi- 
tively related to importance-weighted recall of arguments favoring the 
defendant and negatively related to importance-weighted recall of argu- 
ments favoring the plaintiff. The defendants', however, were unrelated 
to recall. 
V. ASSESSING THE ROLE OF SELF-SERVING BIAS IN SETTLEMENT 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Our experiment provides strong evidence for the existence of a self- 
serving bias. The magnitude of the bias is large-approximately one-half 
the value of the judge's actual settlement-whether measured by predic- 
tions of the judge's award or perceived fair-settlement points. Thus, the 
central assumption of the Priest-Klein model-that errors in the estima- 
tion of potential award amounts are random-is rejected. 
Moreover, the statistical link between the bias and nonsettlement is 
strong. The magnitude of the bias, although also present among pairs 
who settled, is over three times greater for pairs who did not. The strong 
correlation between the magnitude of the bias in a particular bargaining 
pair and nonsettlement supports the self-serving bias explanation for non- 
settlement. We cannot, however, rule out alternative explanations for the 
findings. Perhaps, some third factor, such as a particular character trait 
on the part of the negotiators, influenced both interpretations of fairness 
and negotiating behavior, creating a statistical association in the absence 
of a causal relationship.43 
42 Of course, these benefits of a sense of entitlement have to be weighed against the 
increased risk of not settling. 
43 In a subsequent experiment, we eliminated this possibility by manipulating self-serving 
interpretations of fairness and examining the effect of the manipulation on negotiator behav- 
ior and outcomes. We assigned some subjects their roles (plaintiff and defendant) before 
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Assuming that the bias does influence settlement, exactly how it does 
so is unclear. In the introduction, we posited two different views of bar- 
gaining behavior-one assuming that bargainers are biased expected- 
value maximizers, the other assuming that they are simply trying to ob- 
tain what they believe is a fair deal. The finding that fairness assessments 
were slightly better predictors of both the probability and amount of 
settlement than predictions of the judge's award supports the notion that 
people are trying to reach a fair settlement rather than maximize expected 
value. Also supportive is the generally weak or absent effect of costs on 
settlement, settlement amounts, or parties' perceptions of fairness. In the 
introduction, we hypothesized that perceptions of a fair settlement were 
likely to depend on the features of the case rather than the costs each 
side would bear contingent on nonsettlement. The finding that assessed 
fair-settlement points were not related to costs supports this hypothesis. 
One finding that was consistent with the economic perspective was the 
higher settlements in condition B (elevated defendant costs). Whether 
this was a fluke or a robust effect is unclear. Contrary to the economic 
prediction, when plaintiff costs were elevated, the award amount also 
tended to rise, although the effect was not significant. Also contrary to 
the received legal-economic wisdom,44 the magnitude of the costs did not 
appear to influence the settlement rate. This finding replicates earlier 
experimental findings relating to suit settlement.45 In sum, the data are 
not entirely consistent with either of these views, perhaps indicating that 
neither view is accurate or that there is heterogeneity in the subject popu- 
lation with respect to underlying motivation. 
Finally, we tested the recall-based explanation for the egocentric bias 
by asking subjects to list and rate the importance of arguments favoring 
both sides. Consistent with this explanation, we observed a significant 
bias in recall and importance weighting of those arguments. Both defen- 
dants and plaintiffs recalled more arguments from the case favoring their 
own position and believed that a judge or jury would find arguments 
favoring themselves to be more important than those favoring the other 
side. We also found that both measures of recall were related to settle- 
ment in the expected direction, although the relationship was significant 
only for the importance-weighted measure. In general, the statistical rela- 
reading the case materials and others after reading the case materials but before negotiating. 
All subjects in the latter group settled out of court; in the former condition, 39 percent failed 
to settle out of court. See Linda C. Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, & 
Colin F. Camerer, Do Bargainers Form Biased Expectations of Fairness in Bargaining? 
Am. Econ. Rev. (1993, in press). 
44 See Coursey & Stanley, supra note 33; Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 3. 
45 Coursey & Stanley, supra note 33. 
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tionships between the recall measures and outcome variables (for exam- 
ple, settlement and settlement values) were weaker than those between 
outcome variables and direct measures of fairness or predictions of the 
judge's award. This finding is consistent with the notion that such fairness 
assessments are intervening variables that create a link between recall 
and bargaining behavior. The weakness of these relationships, however, 
also could be due to either the fact that recall does not play a role in 
producing the bias or our relatively crude measures of recall. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Experimentation is by now commonplace in research on bargaining.4 
Our experiment, however, differs in two important respects from most 
others. First, most earlier studies involved stylized disputes in which no 
contextual information is provided. In experimental research involving 
arbitration, arbitrated decisions have been reached by drawing a random 
number from a bingo cage as opposed to using a human arbitrator. In 
contrast, our dispute placed subjects in a well-understood and familiar 
negotiating setting, exposed them to an abundance of realistic contextual 
information, and confronted them with the decision of a real arbitrator. 
The reason for using an actual law case was that the self-serving inter- 
pretations of fairness that we hypothesize occur in real disputes are more 
likely to emerge and are more readily studied in an experiment involving 
a case with multifacted arguments, therefore affording multiple interpre- 
tations of fairness. This does not mean that the self-serving bias will not 
occur in a more stylized dispute. Indeed, there is evidence of such a bias 
in earlier research on stylized bargaining situations. The richer experi- 
mental setting, however, provides a better environment in which to ob- 
serve the actual magnitude of the bias in real-world disputes. 
The design's main disadvantage is that subjects may bring preconcep- 
tions of how they should behave in such a situation. We should note, 
however, that negotiators also bring such preconceptions to actual negoti- 
ations. Moreover, the same criticism applies to all experiments. Subtle 
cues and the subjects' conjectures about the point of the experiment and 
the situation it is intended to represent will always influence behavior. In 
our experiment, the influence is simply more explicit. 
Our experiment is different from earlier empirical investigations in that 
it is a one-shot negotiation. Other studies typically observe negotiation 
46 See, for example, Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in Handbook of Experimen- 
tal Economics (John Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. 1992, in press); Robyn M. Dawes & 
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 187 (1988). 
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outcomes over a series of trials that allow subjects to learn from experi- 
ence. The benefit of our method is that it permits the use of realistic 
experimental stimuli and allows for a long bargaining period (30 minutes). 
Other experiments have involved much shorter bargaining periods.47 The 
disadvantage is that it does not provide information about the effect of 
learning. On the one hand, if given multiple opportunities to participate 
in the experiment, subjects might exhibit less bias and greater tendencies 
to settle. On the other hand, the feedback provided by repeated play 
could conceivably inflame self-serving assessments and make impasse 
more frequent if subjects selectively encode feedback or ignore discon- 
firming feedback instead of learning from it. 
In any case, it is unclear whether one-shot experiments or those in 
which subjects repeatedly confront the same situation more closely ap- 
proximate conditions prevailing in actual litigation. Most people partici- 
pate in only a small number of serious disputes, each of which typically 
differs in important respects from those that come before. Differences 
between suits experienced in the past and the present controversy com- 
plicate the task of drawing insights from the former and applying them 
to the latter.48 Moreover, those parties positioned to benefit from experi- 
ence-repeat players in litigation-may bring with them strategic consid- 
erations that compromise the benefits that might otherwise be garnered 
from experience. In the context of litigation, it is widely believed that 
repeat players are more likely to reject efficient settlements in any given 
dispute because of an overriding interest in the development of the gov- 
erning positive law or in fostering a reputation for stubbornness that could 
prove valuable in future disputes. 
Another potential shortcoming of our experiment is that subjects nego- 
tiated for themselves, whereas, in most high-stakes law suits, litigants 
hire agents to negotiate on their behalf. As a referee commented, "The 
fact that litigants may have self-serving biases says nothing about their 
agents." There are two main reasons why agents might not exhibit the 
bias. 
47 For example, the bargaining time in the Stanley & Coursey, supra note 8, experiments 
was only 4 minutes. 
48 As one commentator noted, "[P]redicting liability in the particular case based on re- 
sults in past cases is of limited utility. Factual differences between the similar claims and 
the particular claim make predictions about the particular claim problematic because of the 
difficulty of isolating those factors on which liability is premised. A witness may not have 
been credible, a particular exhibit may have been presented in one case but not another, 
and so on, making comparisons tenuous between the sampled cases and the particular 
case." Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 
J. Dispute Resolution 1, 9-10. The difficulty of learning from experience is demonstrated 
in numerous social-science investigations. See Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from Experience 
and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making, in Judgment under Uncertainty, supra note 12, 
at 268 (providing evidence of internalization of incorrect rules from experience). 
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First, agents typically participate in large numbers of cases providing 
ample opportunitity for learning from experience; after failing to settle a 
large fraction of cases, they might learn to moderate their demands. This 
would require agents to learn the right lesson from repeated attempts to 
settle-namely, that their own demands are unrealistic-as opposed to 
attributing nonsettlement to the actions of the opposing party.49 In order 
to benefit from prior experience, the agents would also need to be able 
to persuade their less experienced principles to moderate their demands. 
Whether either of these conditions would be met is questionable. 
Second, it is possible that agents face incentives that discourage self- 
serving assessments of fairness. Incentives might moderate the bias if 
agents were particularly hurt by nonsettlement, which would be true if 
repeated nonsettlement caused them to lose business or if fee structures 
were designed to make nonsettlement unattractive. We suspect, how- 
ever, that both of these factors work in the opposite direction, encourag- 
ing self-serving assessments of fairness. First, trials are much more sa- 
lient events than settlements; it seems probable that agents are judged 
more on their ability to win trials than on their ability to settle out of 
court. Second, since many lawyers bill for services rather than on a 
contingency basis, there are often strong incentives to avoid settlement 
so as to increase costs. Finally, the incentives argument is premised on 
the notion that the bias is a deliberate one. Yet our experiment indicates 
that the bias is unintentional since it occurred even though we rewarded 
subjects for accurately predicting the judge's award and did not permit 
them to share their predictions with the other party (eliminating any stra- 
tegic value to misestimation).50 
Self-serving biases create a genuine dilemma for the resolution of legal 
disputes. The legal literature posits that the failure to settle results from 
49 Evidence obtained in a separate experiment involving the same legal case points to the 
problematical nature of learning. Before they assessed fairness and predicted the judge's 
ruling, we informed subjects of the self-serving bias and of its average magnitude. We also 
had them guess at the other party's estimate of the judge. Being informed of the bias had 
no effect on the subjects' own predictions or assessments; the magnitude of the bias was 
unchanged. Knowing about the bias, however, caused them to change their estimates of 
their opponent's guess of the judge's ruling. Subjects told about the bias thought that the 
information only applied to the other party; they shifted their estimates of the other party's 
prediction but did not change their own. See Babcock et al., supra note 43. 
50 The proposition that agents would not exhibit the self-serving bias is testable. A possi- 
ble joint test for the effect of learning, experience, and the weeding-out effect of the market 
would involve running experienced lawyers through the experiment to see whether they 
exhibit the egocentric bias. To test the effect of incentives, one could run the experiment 
using as negotiators intermediaries whose incentives were tied to those of the principals in 
a manner approximating the remuneration schemes of agents in actual litigation. Less di- 
rectly, one could question potential users of legal services about the perceived expertise of 
different lawyers or law firms and correlate these perceptions with rates of settlement and 
with successful and unsuccessful litigation. 
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uncertainty arising from two sources. First, the state of the law may 
not be well resolved, resulting in uncertainty about the judge's eventual 
decision and the opponent's expectation of the judge's decision. In such 
cases, the legal academic literature's expectation would be that disputes 
will fail to settle until a sufficient quantum of litigation has clarified the 
legal rules.51 Second, the literature has focused on imperfect or asymmet- 
rical information concerning the facts of the case sub judice as a key 
obstacle to settlement.52 
The elaborate discovery rules governing the costly pretrial exchange 
of information in litigation are predicated on a view that shared informa- 
tion leads to a convergence of perspectives by the parties involved. This 
view begins with an objective standard from which parties enter the bar- 
gaining process: parties have to assess the likelihood of a plaintiff's pre- 
vailing at trial, and that assessment will affect the way in which they 
calculate the expected value of the litigation. Imperfect information 
allows parties to have nonoverlapping estimations of either the likelihood 
of a plaintiff's prevailing or the plaintiff's potential award. Since the 
source of the incompatible estimations of the claim's value is lack of 
information rather than deep-seated biases or other systemic distortions, 
it is assumed that the cure lies with additional information.53 
As structured, civil litigation attempts to promote settlement by isolat- 
ing genuine uncertainty about the law and by providing the parties with 
liberal access to each other's information. Unfortunately, both the 
streamlining of legal issues54 and the discovery of information are tremen- 
dously costly processes.55 
This study reveals the shakiness of the assumption that the parties will 
integrate the information revealed through these processes in an unbiased 
fashion in order to settle. Rather, our study shows that, even with per- 
51 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J. Law & Econ. 249 (1976); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law 511 (3d ed. 1986); Charles Silver, Do We Know Enough about Legal 
Norms, in Social Rules: Origin; Character; Logic; Change (David Braybrooke ed. 1993, in 
press). 
52 See Posner, supra note 51, at 525; Posner, supra note 1, at 422-26. See also Issacharoff 
& Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 111-14 (criticizing this view). 
53 Thus, under the Posnerian view of litigation, all rules aimed at producing more common 
information should encourage settlement by removing any subjective distortions introduced 
by the parties. Once the additional information is processed and integrated, the biases of 
the parties will be overcome, their respective assessments of the value of the litigation will 
converge, and, in the absence of uncertainty about the governing law, settlements should 
ensue. See Posner, supra note 51, at 525; Posner, supra note 1, at 422-26. 
54 The most common procedures are the motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. 
55 See David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L. F. Felstinger, Herbert M. Kritzer, & 
Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72 (1983). 
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fectly shared information and a complete absence of disputed legal issues, 
self-serving biases can cause inefficient impasses. On a theoretical plane, 
this study points to a view that litigants may not be seeking to maximize 
their own payoff, as assumed by analyses focusing on settlement zones, 
but rather may be seeking simply to obtain what they deem fair. If this 
is the case, we would not expect the settlement zone to make much 
difference causally, although assessments of fairness no doubt would in- 
fluence the settlement zone. 
If nonsettlement is driven by systematic bias instead of random error 
or a lack of information, the practical ramifications are numerous. First, it 
indicates that exchanges of information are not in themselves necessarily 
conducive to settlement but must be analyzed in terms of how they inter- 
act with preexisting biases. Second, it suggests that effective alternative 
dispute-resolution mechanisms, at least in part, should be directed at 
"debiasing" parties rather than simply facilitating the exchange of infor- 
mation. 
APPENDIX 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONDITION A 
Sudden Impact: Elmo Johnson, Defendant 
In this experiment you will play the role of Elmo Johnson. Your goal is to 
settle a civil suit brought against you by Rick Jones. The case is a distilled version 
of an actual lawsuit that took place in Texas. Jones accuses you of hitting his 
motorcycle with your car and causing him injuries. He is asking for $100,000 in 
damages, but if the case goes to trial the actual award could be anything between $0 and $100,000. 
You will have thirty minutes to read the case and thirty minutes to settle the 
case by negotiating with Jones. We have secured a judgment from a retired Texas 
judge who was not involved in the original case. If you are unable to settle the 
case with Jones, you will "go to trial," and the judge's decision will determine 
the magnitude of the settlement. The judgment is contained in an envelope in our 
possession. 
If you are unable to settle, you will need to add $10,000 to whatever the judge 
determines that you owe Jones. The $10,000 is for legal expenses incurred in 
going to trial. Jones will also bear $10,000 in legal expenses so that, if you go to 
trial, he will need to deduct $10,000 in costs from whatever you end up paying 
him. 
We have given you $12 to start off with. Please do not discuss this amount 
with the other subject. But you are responsible for any payments to the other 
subject as well as legal costs. Every $10,000 loss to Johnson is a $1 loss for you. 
So, for example, if you settled at $50,000, you would pay the other subject $5.00. 
If you failed to settle, and the judge awarded Jones $50,000, then you would pay 
the other subject $5.00, and you would pay the experimenter $1.00 in legal ex- 
penses. The other subject would get the $5.00 you pay but would also pay the 
experimenter $1.00 in legal expenses. 
